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Why cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience is still the most plausible account  
Albert Newen, Petra Vetter 
 
Abstract: To what extent is our perceptual experience influenced by higher cognitive 
phenomena like beliefs, desires, concepts, templates? Given recent arguments against the 
possibility of cognitive penetration, we present striking evidence against the impenetrability 
claims. The weak impenetrability claim cannot account for (1) extensive structural feedback 
organization of the brain, (2) temporally very early feedback loops and (3) functional top-
down processes modulating early visual processes by category-specific information. The 
strong impenetrability claim could incorporate these data by widening the “perceptual 
module” such that it includes rich but still internal processing in a very large perceptual 
module. We argue that this latter view leads to an implausible version of a module. Therefore, 
we have to accept cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience as the best theoretical 
account so far given the available empirical evidence. We outline that this does not have any 
problematic consequences for the relation between perception and cognition.  
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1 Clarifying the claims and shifting the burden of proof 
What is cognitive penetration? Cognitive penetrability is a phenomenon that occurs if higher-
level cognitive phenomena (states or events or processes), such as beliefs, desires, intentions, 
concepts etc., directly influence our perceptual experience. In other words, if cognitive 
penetration takes place, what one believes, desires, intends, etc., may alter what one sees, hears, 
etc. To get the debate adequately off the ground, we need to be more precise. As a first step, we 
can rely on the definition of the necessary conditions for cognitive penetration (being altogether 
sufficient) as offered by MacPherson (2012). What is held constant is: 1. the object or scenario 
causing the visual input, 2. the perceptual conditions, 3. normally functioning sensory organs 
and 4. the absence of spatial attentional shifts. If a higher-level cognitive process (we will speak 
of a “process” as the paradigmatic phenomenon but also allow for states or events) can 
nevertheless change the perceptual experience, this is a case of cognitive penetration in a narrow 
sense. What penetrates and what gets penetrated? Just to repeat: the penetration comes from an 
activation of higher cognitive processes like beliefs, desires or concepts, more precisely, it 
comes from the activation of the content of these higher cognitive processes. The object of 
penetration is my perceptual experience. What is the nature of the penetrating relation? 
Regarding the question on whether cognitive penetration is a causal (Siegel, 2005) or a rational 
(Pylyshyn, 1999) relation, we take the side of Siegel and presuppose that it is sufficient if there 
is a relevant causal relation1 between the content of a higher cognitive process and the percept 
that is influenced by it (given that the content of the higher-cognitive process is part of the 
relevant causal factors). On the contrary, the claim of cognitive impenetrability is the principle 
claim that cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience never happens. So far, the 
community is still concerned with the principle debate of whether perceptual experience is 
penetrable or impenetrable.  
Before entering the discussion, it helps to clarify what exactly the claims of the two opposing 
camps in the discussion are. In the classic paper of Pylyshyn (1999), he defends a weak version 
of cognitive impenetrability since he limits his claim such that cognitive impenetrability is only 
valid for early visual processes. Thus, he allows for two possible interventions of higher 
cognitive processes onto perceptual processes that do not conflict with an impenetrability thesis: 
1. the modification of sensory input by change of attention prior to early visual processes and 
                                                          
1 It is common ground in the literature that we need to exclude some causal chains as irrelevant, e.g. if my thinking 
about an upcoming exam causes migraine and this induces light flashes as part of my visual experience. This would 
not count as a case of cognitive penetration as the light flashes are not systematically caused by my thinking about 
the exam, but are only accidentally related. For most persons, thinking about an exam does neither cause migraine 
nor does it lead to light flashes. To exclude these cases, some philosophers argue that we need to presuppose a 
rational (or semantic) relation in addition to a causal chain. But the latter is too demanding (without further 
argument) since it is more straight forward to demand a relevant causal chain. Furthermore, let us presuppose – 
for the sake of argument – that the following would be a paradigmatic case of cognitive penetration, e.g. we activate 
different color concepts and thereby have a different color experience (while all the other perceptual conditions as 
defined above remain fixed). It seems to be going much too far to claim that we need a rational or semantic relation 
concerning this effect: Cognitive penetration just claims that there is a modified perceptual experience caused in 
a relevant way. Why should we presuppose that any step in the complex causal route resulting in a modified 
perceptual experience must not only be a causal but also a rational or semantic relation (as argued by MacPherson, 
2016)? Why should we exclude such an ideal case if there is a causal chain involved which we do not understand 
any more than just by the fact that it is a non-accidental and systematic way the brain processes such situations?  
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2. the “interpretation” which takes place after early visual processes but – as we read him – 
prior to the completion of our perceptual experience. 
„Our hypothesis is that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception at only two loci. 
(…) These two loci are: (a) in the allocation of attention to certain locations or certain properties 
prior to the operation of early vision (…) (b) in the decisions involved in recognizing and identifying 
patterns after the operation of early vision. Such a stage may (or in some cases must) access 
background knowledge as it pertains to the interpretation of a particular stimulus.” (Pylyshyn, 1999) 
Thus, Pylyshyn defends cognitive impenetrability only for a module of early visual processes 
(leaving those underdetermined). In an updated view, Raftopolous (2014) even constrained an 
early visual processing module to those areas which are involved in the first 100 msec after 
visual stimulation.  
A much more radical claim is taken in the recent paper by Firestone and Scholl (2015). After 
having discussed important methodological pitfalls and thereby setting a new bar for proofs of 
cognitive penetration, they express their view very clearly: “Until this high bar is met, it will 
remain eminently plausible that there are no top-down effects of cognition on perception.” 
Thus, they claim that influences from higher cognitive processes only occur prior to any kind 
of visual processes and after the completion of a visual percept: in between, visual perception 
is created in a large visual processing module that is cognitively impenetrable. 
What is our strategy of argumentation? To oppose the claim of cognitive impenetrability, we 
should consider at least the two versions of the claim: the weak impenetrability claim that only 
some early visual processes form a cognitively impenetrable module (Pylyshyn, 1999) or the 
strong impenetrability claim that all processes forming our visual experience are cognitively 
impenetrable (Firestone & Scholl, 2015); in both cases the perceptual conditions mentioned in 
the definition above should remain constant, i.e. the visual input, the focussed attention, 
normally functioning sensory organs as well as the external perceptual conditions. In our 
defence of cognitive penetrability we will present the most striking evidence and aim for a 
scientific evaluation of the most plausible theory accounting for it. We will conclude that 
despite lacking an experimentum cruxis for the time being, there is a large amount of evidence 
supporting the thesis of cognitive penetration according to the principle of best explanation. 
This line of approach also requires highlighting the most important evidence in favour of the 
opposing impenetrability thesis. However, our argumentation will shift the burden of proof 
towards the defenders of cognitive impenetrability. Furthermore, we will outline the most 
plausible view of the interface between perception and cognition that is compatible with our 
main defence of cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. 
Why should we accept the radical claim of cognitive impenetrability in the first place? What is 
the most striking evidence in favour of cognitive impenetrability? First of all, we have to 
account for the phenomenon of visual illusions that remain stable even if we are fully informed 
about the illusionary status of our experience. Let us stick with the simple and well-known 
example of the Müller-Lyer illusion: two arrows (with different orientation of the arrowheads) 
are perceived as having different length even after measuring the length of the main lines and 
assuring myself that they are indeed of the same length. My knowledge does not influence my 
perceptual experience in such a scenario. However, it does not follow from this observation that 
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all perceptual experiences in all perceptual scenarios can never be penetrated by contents of 
higher cognitive processes. The reply of the opponent could be that visual illusions allow us to 
discover construction principles of perception which remain active in everyday perception as 
well. Again, we agree that these construction principles exist and that they remain active but 
we disagree that that these construction principles can never be influenced by higher cognitive 
processes just because they remain dominant or compete with each other in the special 
perceptual circumstances of visual illusions. Generalising from the special case of visual 
illusion to everyday visual experience is a radical overgeneralization which lacks supporting 
evidence. We can grant that there are basic principles of constructing a perceptual experience 
of line length (or orientation etc.) which cannot be influenced by our beliefs in many situations. 
But why should we accept that they can in principle never be influenced by any higher cognitive 
content? This must at least presuppose that visual illusions are the standard cases of perception 
but in fact the contrary seems to be the case: if visual illusions are the rare exceptions of our 
everyday visual experiences, we must be careful to generalize from the exceptional cases to the 
standard cases without any further evidence. The second main argument in favour of cognitive 
impenetrability is the functional specialization of visual brain areas: if there is a lesion in color 
processing area V4, we perceive the world in shades of black and white lacking any colors. If 
someone suffers from a lesion in motion area V5, she is unable to perceive the motion flow of 
filling a glass with water. Functional specialization of visual brain areas is a major discovery. 
But what does it entail? At most we can argue that some type of information (color information) 
can only be adequately processed to become part of our perceptual experience if it is processed 
by this module. Maybe V4 is domain-specific in the sense that it mainly processes color 
information but it does not follow at all that V4 cannot be influenced by higher cognitive 
contents. Functional specialization of brain areas by itself does not imply cognitive 
impenetrability. We suspect that this unjustified implication is based on the fact that Fodor 
(1983) defined modules with several main criteria combining domain-specificity, 
impenetrability and being innate. But this definition of combined module criteria should not 
mislead us. Without further evidence the definition is just not well chosen: domain-specificity 
and impenetrability need not go together. To come to an intermediate conclusion: We are 
lacking convincing evidence for the thesis of cognitive impenetrability of our perceptual 
experience in the first place and thus the burden of proof lies on the proponents of this claim.  
We will now describe positive evidence supporting the thesis that cognitive penetration of our 
perceptual experience can in fact take place. The positive evidence is sometimes also used to 
make an argument against one or both versions of the impenetrability thesis. Since Pylyshyn 
constrains his claim to early visual processes together with the idea that these early visual 
processes are implemented in an impenetrable perceptual module, this claim can be discussed 
in light of recent empirical findings concerning perceptual processes and brain modularity. In 
the case of the strong impenetrability thesis (e.g. Firestone and Scholl, 2015), it is more difficult 
to reject (or defend) an impenetrable perceptual module: although a vision module is usually 
defined, it is not constrained with regard to what it should contain in terms of functional brain 
areas. The observation of stable visual illusions is often taken as a main argument for 
impenetrability. However, visual illusions only indicate that in some exceptional perceptual 
scenarios there is a difference between some low-level processes and our knowledge that is 
unable to penetrate the illusion. As a consequence, a very large unspecified black box is 
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described containing all processes after the sensory stimulation has happened and before the 
creation of the percept is completed. This view entails several central problems. To repeat one 
worry: Why should we accept the generalization of exceptional cases of visual illusions to any 
case of everyday perceptual experience? Further conceptual problems are: If the black box 
contains such a large amount of processes, why should we believe that this black box does not 
contain types of processes which, under non-illusionary circumstances, clearly count as higher 
cognitive processes? Maybe this large black box could involve typical cognitive processes right 
from the start? It may be possible that in some perceptual scenarios, low-level processes 
dominate higher cognitive processes in the creation of the visual percept. Finally, such a big 
black-box-module is not functionally specialized and contains a great variety of processes. This 
makes it more difficult to prove that it nevertheless should remain impenetrable. Thus, the larger 
the supposed vision module, the higher the burden of proof for the impenetrability claim to be 
plausible.  
A similar argument can be made for the weak impenetrability thesis. If one supposes some basic 
and very early visual processes as being impenetrable, then this asks for a module that becomes 
smaller and earlier every time research methodologies achieve a higher resolution. The 
principle problem lies in the postulation of a clear-cut and impenetrable module per se. As we 
argued above, while some brain areas are certainly functionally specialised to some 
predominant functions, this does not mean they have clear-cut functional boundaries that cannot 
be penetrated by contents from other brain areas. Postulating an impenetrable module, whether 
implausibly large or very small, will always entail a boundary that is not tenable. We will 
provide further arguments against such a module in the following section.    
 
2. Arguments against an encapsulated and impenetrable perceptual module 
2.1. Structural arguments 
Both from a functional and neuroanatomical perspective, there is no evidence for an 
encapsulated and impenetrable visual module. Of course, functional specialisation in the brain 
exists, for example, V4 predominantly processes color, and V5 predominantly processes 
motion, but this does not exclude the possibility that these areas process, to a weaker extent, 
also other types of information. For example, in the case of the fusiform face area (FFA), it was 
initially argued that this area only processes visual information from faces (Kanwisher et al., 
1999; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2006) until, later on, the FFA was shown to selectively respond also 
to cars, birds and other object categories (Gauthier et al., 2000; Cukur et al., 2013). This does 
not deny that FFA predominantly processes faces, the novel evidence just denies that it uniquely 
processes faces. Likewise for many other specialised brain areas, it is well possible that the 
future will reveal additional functions that we cannot even imagine yet. In the case of V1, 
despite it is being one of the most extensively studied area in the brain, models can so far explain 
only up to 40% of V1’s processing variance during natural vision (David & Gallant, 2005; 
Carandini et al., 2005). That is, there is a lot of remaining unexplained processing function in 
V1 that may surprise us in the future. Thus, assigning a sole function to a specialised brain area 
is a risky endeavour as we simply do not know enough about even a single brain area. It is 
therefore unjustified to speak of a brain area as restricted to one functional role. Thus, against 
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the traditional view of Pylyshyn (1999) and Raftopolos (2014), we simply lack evidence for a 
perceptual module in the strict sense of a functionally isolated module. And even if we grant 
the existence of a somewhat functionally specialized module, this still does not decide on its 
being cognitively impenetrable or not. Let us now have a brief look on the question of 
impenetrability from the structural perspective.  
Also from a neuroanatomical perspective it is unjustified to speak of impenetrable modules in 
the brain. Recent evidence shows that cortical brain areas are much more heavily interconnected 
than previously thought, namely to 66%. That is, each brain area is connected to 66% of the 
rest of the brain (Markov et al., 2013). While the majority of these connections are short-
distance connections between neighbouring areas, the hierarchical structure of the brain implies 
a cascade of interconnected brain areas across processing levels. As Gilbert and Li (2013) put 
it:  
“The source of top-down influences can be widespread, either by direct connections from different 
cortical areas or by a cascade of inputs originating from many more areas. In effect, a large part of 
the cerebral cortex can exert influences over individual neurons within a particular area, with 
multiple descending inputs interacting with intrinsic cortical connections. As such, each neuron is a 
microcosm of the brain as a whole, with synapses carrying information originating from far flung 
brain regions.“  
Both Markov et al., (2013) and Gilbert and Li (2013) base their claims on a vast amount of 
empirical evidence (most of it being unknown at the time Pylyshyn wrote his 1999 article, and 
entirely ignored by Firestone and Scholl, 2015). 
That is, given that each brain area is highly interconnected to a large amount of other brain 
areas, it is implausible to suggest that any brain area is strictly specialised and impenetrable by 
other brain areas including higher cognitive processes. Thus, from a structural point of view, 
penetration of a visual module can easily be realized by higher cognitive areas via a top-down 
cascade of intermediate brain areas. All these connections in the brain have evolved throughout 
human and mammalian evolution, and are pruned during development, they must serve a 
function and are not just an epiphenomenon. Therefore, acknowledging the anatomical fact of 
a highly interconnected brain makes an impenetrable brain module implausible.  
Particularly for the case of vision, recent years have seen a large amount of empirical evidence 
for feedback connections to visual cortex and their role in exerting top-down influences. Many 
other authors have reviewed this evidence in detail (e.g. Gilbert & Li, 2013; Petro, Vizioli & 
Muckli, 2014). While the exact role of feedback connections is under-researched, e.g. with 
respect to the nature of the information they exactly convey and how exactly they are involved 
in visual processing, their structural and functional existence is widely accepted. Again, from 
this structural and evolutionary point of view, it is implausible to assume that all this large 
amount of feedback connections to visual cortex is a mere epiphenomenon without functional 
significance in brain processing and creating perceptual experience. In light of all this widely 
accepted evidence, the claim of a functionally encapsulated and impenetrable perceptual 
module is simply not plausible, neither for the weak nor for the strong impenetrability claim. 
Thus, concerning the structural organization of the brain the burden of proof lies on the 
proponents of an impenetrable and encapsulated perceptual module to show where and how it 
could be implemented in the brain. 
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As we will also see in the following section, the bidirectional structure of feedforward and 
feedback connections mediates constant and recurrent feedforward and feedback processing 
that is necessary for conscious perceptual experience (e.g. Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). This 
recurrent feedforward and feedback processing seems to be particularly important for 
naturalistic complex visual stimuli that require segmenting objects in the foreground from a 
cluttered background akin to our natural visual circumstances (e.g. Hupe et al., 1998; Scholte 
et al., 2008). Many visual phenomena are studied with simple and impoverished visual stimuli 
that subchallenge the visual system. Also some visual illusions that have been used to support 
the impenetrability claim are rather impoverished stimuli (e.g. the Mueller-Lyer illusion). It is 
of course easy to propose an impenetrable perceptual module with a single feed-forward sweep 
for very simple and impoverished visual stimuli because these stimuli do not tax the visual 
system very much. However, this model is not functional in naturalistic vision – for visual 
perception in a complex and cluttered environment as we are confronted with in everyday life, 
recurrent processing between many visual brain areas is necessary and no meaningful 
perceptual content could be derived from a single impenetrable module.  
 
2.2. Arguments from temporal processing 
Sometimes an early vision module is proposed on the basis of some basic visual processing 
supposedly happening very fast and bottom-up, too fast to be affected by top-down processing. 
However, the original notion of “early” and “late” processes has been challenged by evidence 
showing that even supposedly “late”, higher level processes occur much earlier than previously 
thought. Time-resolving electrophysiological evidence showed that visual cortex is activated 
within 50 ms and pre-frontal areas within 80 ms after visual stimulus onset. This leaves plenty 
of time for iterative top-down processing between “cognitive”, e.g. frontal and parietal, areas 
and sensory, e.g. occipital, areas, within the first 100 – 200 ms after visual stimulation (Foxe & 
Simpson, 2002). Thus, complex high level and reiterative processing can happen very fast and 
can influence visual processing very early on (Michel, Seek & Murray, 2004; Plomp et al., 
2015).  
Within the visual system, there is considerable evidence for fast top-down processing already 
within the first 50 ms after stimulus onset, certainly between motion area V5 and primary visual 
cortex V1 during motion perception (e.g. Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Silvanto et al., 2005; 
Vetter et al., 2015), sometimes even shown to occur as early as 10 ms (Hupé et al., 2001). In 
turn, the frontal eye fields (FEF), a higher-level area in frontal cortex involved in motor 
planning of eye movements, exerts its influence to V5 within 30 ms (Silvanto, Lavie & Walsh, 
2006). Therefore, a feedback loop from a frontal region to an early occipital region can take as 
little as 80 ms or less. Importantly, this feedback happens in a task-specific manner, telling us 
something about the information conveyed in this feedback: when the task requires face 
recognition, FEF signals are sent to face-sensitive regions and when the task requires motion 
discrimination, FEF signals are sent to motion area V5, both within a time frame of 20-40 ms 
after FEF activity (Morishima et al., 2007). Therefore, top-down signals from a frontal region 
to earlier visual regions do not occur in a general and unspecific manner. Instead, they carry 
task-specific, and thus higher-level cognitive information, and are transmitted very quickly. 
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These fast top-down signals from FEF have actual perceptual consequences: For example, 
during visual conjunction search (searching for an item defined by the conjunction of two 
features, e.g. a red horizontal line in a display of green and red horizontal and vertical lines), 
FEF exerts its perceptual effect as fast as 40-80 ms after visual stimulus onset (O’Shea et al., 
2006). Also object shape recognition involves recurrent “round-trip” feedforward and feedback 
processing within 60 ms (Drewes et al., 2016). Now, whether object shape recognition or 
conjunction search is classified as a cognitive or purely perceptual process is a distinction that 
is key to the debate on cognitive penetrability but hardly addressed. We will come back to this 
question later. However, in many discussions on cognitive penetration, object shape recognition 
has been considered to be a cognitive process.  
What follows from this (non-exhaustively reviewed) literature is that top-down influences from 
higher level areas to “early” visual cortex can occur very early, and much earlier than previously 
thought. Thus, it is unjustified to conclude from an early timing of a visual process for it to be 
unaffected by top-down influences or feedback. In fact, it is more likely that both feedforward 
and feedback processes happen in parallel rather than in a strictly serial manner. Hupe et al. 
(2001) say: “[…] Cortico-cortical connections in the visual cortex must be conceptualized as a 
network of interacting areas responding with near-simultaneity, rather than as a pipeline-type 
architecture.” All this empirical evidence especially speaks against the weak impenetrability 
claim in a version where early visual processes are defined by temporal criteria as e.g. proposed 
by Raftopolous (2011, 18): “Early vision includes a feed forward sweep (FFS) in which signals 
are transmitted bottom-up. In visual areas (from LGN to IT) FFS lasts for about 100 ms.” Again, 
the burden of proof concerning temporal processing is shifted towards the proponents of a weak 
impenetrability claim: they must demonstrate that there still remains a dimension of visual 
processing that is never influenced by any top-down signals originating in cognitive processing 
areas. This line of argument runs into the trap of postulating an implausibly small impenetrable 
“perceptual” module as already mentioned at the end of section 1. Even if the existence of a 
very small module that is extremely constrained in spatial and temporal processing could be 
demonstrated, this would no longer be a plausible candidate for a perceptual module. Whatever 
the function of such a small module, it would no longer be sufficient to constitute the core part 
of perception (given the evidence we have already presented). 
 
2.3. Functional evidence for categorical top-down influences to early vision: Category-
specific information can be transferred to early visual cortex  
Let us pick one example from our own work demonstrating how feedback from higher brain 
areas, carrying categorical and semantic information, affects early visual cortex, thus providing 
evidence against an impenetrable early vision module. Vetter et al. (2014) presented human 
participants with natural sounds, e.g. sounds from naturalistic environments such as people 
talking at a party, traffic noise from a street scene and bird singing from a forest scene. 
Participants listened to these sounds while lying in an MRI scanner and being blindfolded, that 
is, there was no visual information entering the brain. Thus, while visual cortex was never 
actually stimulated with feed-forward retinal input, Vetter et al. (2014) showed that neural 
activity patterns in early visual cortex were distinct depending on the semantic content of the 
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sound. That is, different natural sounds elicited distinct neural activity patterns in early visual 
cortex in the absence of visual stimulation. Given that there was no feedforward visual 
stimulation, the content-specific sound information must have been transferred to early visual 
cortex by feedback from other parts of the brain.  
If one wanted to interpret these results in agreement with an impenetrable early visual module, 
one would have to make several assumptions. For example, one could argue that auditory 
perception of natural sounds does not require much cognitive processing and can be achieved 
within an early perceptual module. Then the auditory information is passed directly to vision 
within the same perceptual module, ending up as distinct neural activity patterns in early visual 
cortex. This interpretation would be in line with a possibly impenetrable perceptual module. 
However, this interpretation is implausible for many reasons. First, it assumes that early 
audition and early vision happen on the same early perceptual analysis level and thus in the 
same perceptual module. However, this argumentation entails that audition and vision are part 
of the same perceptual module violating an important criteria of a module, namely its functional 
specialisation. Sensory specificity of brain areas has always served as one of the main 
arguments for functional specialisation and modularity: the fact that visual cortex is specialised 
for visual input and auditory cortex for auditory input. Merging both vision and audition in one 
perceptual module violates one of the most basic criteria for a module. Second, this 
interpretation assumes that complex natural sound analysis and recognition can be achieved 
within the perceptual module. However, complex sound analysis requires auditory association 
areas extending beyond primary auditory cortex (e.g. Schirmer et al., 2012, for review). Thus, 
this model is only plausible if one assumes a relatively large perceptual module encompassing 
complex semantic sound analysis. Assuming such a big module runs again into the same 
problem as mentioned above: to what extent can a perceptual module be called purely 
perceptual and not cognitive, if it encompasses complex semantic analysis? We will come back 
to this point again later on. Third, such a perceptual module must be realised in the brain such 
that audition and vision can communicate directly with each other without involving higher 
level, extra-modular brain areas. Anatomically speaking, there are direct anatomical 
connections between early auditory and early visual cortex (Eckert et al., 2008; Beer et al., 
2011), but they are very sparse in number. If one wanted to assume that these connections are 
the only way auditory information is communicated to early visual cortex, then sound 
information should be distinguishable only in early auditory and only in early visual cortex. A 
whole-brain analysis performed in Vetter et al. (2014) demonstrated that this is not the case: 
sound content could also be distinguished in a large part of auditory association cortex and in 
multisensory brain areas such as posterior superior temporal sulcus and precuneus. If one 
wanted to assume an intra-perceptual interpretation, the perceptual module would have to be 
very large and comprise all these higher-level auditory, visual and multi-sensory areas. 
There are further arguments from Vetter et al. (2014) that speak against an impenetrable module 
explanation. One of the additional experiments showed that sound content can be distinguished 
in early visual cortex even when there was neither auditory nor visual stimulation, but when 
participants merely imagined the sounds. That is, even auditory imagination (induced by the 
participants’ will upon a word cue), including auditory memory recollection, induces content-
specific activity patterns in early visual cortex. Furthermore, it was shown that the information 
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transmitted to early visual cortex was shared when sounds were actually heard or when they 
were merely imagined. Thus, also the semantic content of mental imagery is transferred to early 
visual cortex. Again, to explain these results within an impenetrable module, one would have 
to assume a very large module that encompasses mental imagery and its semantic information 
content without involving any cognitive processing. Such an assumption makes the notion of a 
perception-cognition boundary very imprecise and arbitrary.  
Furthermore, there is another crucial result of the Vetter et al. (2014) study: the information 
from sounds that ends up in early visual cortex is not only content-specific, but also category-
specific. That is, when participants are presented with sounds from different scenes that belong 
to the same semantic categories (e.g. traffic noise and the sound of a starting airplane, belonging 
to the category of inanimate sounds), it is the information shared among sound exemplars within 
this semantic category that is transferred to early visual cortex, not the information specific to 
the features of a  particular sound exemplar. That means the information that ends up in early 
visual cortex is categorical and high-level, and thus very likely of semantic nature. This also 
entails that the decoded top-down information does not merely stem from a reactivated mental 
image being similar to, or a weaker version of, a representation induced by retinal feedforward 
stimulation (Pearson et al., 2015). Such a weaker reactivation of a visual representation could 
in principle still be part of a big perceptual module, but the fact that abstract and categorical 
information is represented in early visual cortex speaks for a higher-level origin and excludes a 
low-level feature driven mental imagery influence. Explaining these effects as all occurring 
within a single impenetrable perceptual module would imply a very large perceptual module 
processing auditory and visual information, semantic analysis and categorisation and mental 
imagery. Such a module is conceptually implausible as it would bundle a large amount of 
specialised brain regions and could hardly be defined as purely perceptual anymore.  
The alternative and more plausible explanation is that semantic sound content is extracted in 
auditory association cortex and transmitted through a cascade of feedback connections via 
multi-sensory (and likely imagery-related) brain regions, such as the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus and the precuneus, all the way down to early visual cortex. This explanation 
does not involve giving up functional specialisation, quite to the contrary: brain areas maintain 
their functional specialisation (e.g. for auditory or visual specificity), but are permeable to input 
from other brain regions, both higher up or lower down in the hierarchy, and sending recurrent 
signals back and forth. Like this, no large module has to be defined or an arbitrary distinction 
between perceptual and cognitive brain areas be drawn. The idea of functionally specialised but 
penetrable brain areas being in constant recurrent communication with other brain areas is in 
line with a large amount of functional and anatomical evidence as mentioned above. 
It should be noted that the study by Vetter et al. demonstrates semantic top-down influences to 
early visual cortex, but does not directly show influence on visual perception per se. On the 
behavioural level, cross-modal priming studies demonstrated that semantically congruent 
sounds improve sensitivity of picture identification (Chen & Spence, 2011a &b) and facilitate 
conscious access to a matching image (Chen, Yeh & Spence, 2011). On the neural level, 
however, there is so far little evidence that auditorily induced semantic top-down information 
to early visual cortex actually impacts on visual perception. One reason for this lack of evidence 
might be that with conventional fMRI methods, top-down influences are difficult to detect when 
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early visual cortex is driven by feed-forward visual stimulation. Using more sensitive decoding 
fMRI methods, auditory top-down influences can be detected either in the absence of 
feedforward stimulation (Vetter et al., 2014) or, in the presence of visual stimulation, sharpen 
visual representations in early visual cortex (de Haas et al., 2013). When visual stimulation is 
ambiguous, semantically matching sound information can be discriminated in early visual 
cortex when it helps resolving the visual ambiguity (Vetter et al., 2016).   
Let us summarize the challenge that the above reviewed evidence makes for both versions of 
the impenetrability claim: The weak impenetrability claim has received rather strong 
counterevidence from observations of (1) extensive structural feedback organization of the 
brain, (2) temporally very early feedback loops and (3) functional top-down processes 
modulating early visual processes by category-specific information. The strong impenetrability 
claim could incorporate these data by widening the “perceptual module” such that it includes 
rich but still internal processing in a very large perceptual module: Such a claim must or even 
wants to allow for “smart” perception (e.g. including category-specific information) but at the 
same time needs to demonstrate that all this smartness of perception is radically (and always) 
independent from any top-down influences originating in cognitive processing areas. This latter 
view presupposes an implausible version of a module.   
 
3. Experimental evidence for cognitive penetration of visual experience  
While the above evidence mainly speaks against the weak impenetrability claim and challenges 
the strong impenetrability claim, it still lacks the positive evidence to demonstrate cognitive 
penetration of actual perceptual experience. In the following section we focus on studies that 
clearly show a modification of perceptual color experience by activating abstract concepts and 
we aim to argue that these should best be explained as cases of cognitive penetration. As we 
will highlight, we may not be able to exclude the interpretation of perceptual learning at the 
moment, i.e. the claim of defenders of an impenetrability claim that all reported cases rely on 
long-term learning processes which actually modified the perceptual system and thus do not 
prove cognitive penetration. This analysis will motivate the discussion of short-term influences 
of higher cognitive processes in section 4.  
 
3.1 Visual experience of colors can be affected by color concepts or by visual templates 
The original idea of cognitively modified color experiences goes back to an old experiment by 
Delk and Fillenbaum (1965). Here, participants adjusted the background color for cut-out object 
shapes with typical or non-typical colors (red for a heart shape or color-neutral objects like a 
square or mushroom). While the cut-out objects always consisted of the same orange sheet of 
paper, subjects adjusted the color of the background as more red when the object was typically 
associated with a red color (e.g. a heart or lip) then when it was not. The study suggests that 
participants perceive the color of an object as more red if the shape of the object is associated 
with a red color. As such, this phenomenon can be seen as an example for cognitive penetration: 
the cognitive high-level knowledge that a heart shape is usually red changes basic color 
perception. 
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A modern version of this experiment with more rigorous methodology was carried out by 
Hansen et al. (2006). Here, participants were shown color photographs of fruits with a typical 
color, e.g. a yellow banana, on a grey background on a computer monitor. Participants adjusted 
the color of the fruit online until it appeared neutrally grey to them (while in another task they 
adjusted a grey banana until it appeared to have its natural color). Intriguingly, participants 
adjusted the banana not to its objectively achromatic grey, but to a slightly bluish grey shade – 
a grey opposite of yellow in color space. Thus, the objectively achromatic grey banana still 
appeared slightly yellow, and therefore participants adjusted it more towards blue so that it 
appeared neutrally grey. This effect was found not just for bananas but also for other typically 
colored fruits (e.g. orange, lemon, lettuce). These results nicely demonstrate that the color that 
is abstractly associated with an object shape affects very basic color perception, even if the 
object itself is shown in grey. We take this as a powerful example for cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience: the abstract memorised knowledge of a banana typically being yellow 
affects the basic perceptual experience of color. The advantage of the study by Hansen et al. 
(2006) is that participants adjusted the color of the object online, while seeing the object without 
time constraints. Thus, the study measured direct and veridical perceptual experience without 
relying on memory or matching the percept with a reference.   
Furthermore, this same type of experiment was done with the aim to investigate what we called 
the functional evidence for cognitive penetration: The influence of object identity on color 
perception even if objects are displayed achromatically also has a neural correlate all the way 
down in primary visual cortex V1. Bannert and Bartels (2013) showed in an elegant study that 
the yellow color of a grey banana is represented in the neural activity patterns of V1 even if all 
participants are seeing is a grey banana. That is, even if the feed-forward information to the 
visual system is achromatic grey, the typically associated color information of an object is 
communicated all the way down the visual hierarchy to V1. That is, abstract object identity 
affects veridical perceptual experience and has a neural consequence at the earliest neural 
processing level. Both speak in favour of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience and 
against an impenetrable early vision module. 
How can defenders of cognitive impenetrability try to react to these observations? (a) They 
could argue that cognitive influences occurred at the level of judgment rather than at the level 
of perceptual experience because participants had to “judge” the color of an object when 
adjusting the color of object and background (e.g. in the study of Hansen et al. 2006). This 
argument is not convincing because what we deal with here are very basic online color 
comparisons. If one insists to think of them as perceptual judgments then it is important to 
consider that they are still done under normal perceptual conditions with unambiguous stimuli 
and without the need to learn new concepts. We know that basic evaluations of colors under 
these conditions are very reliable. Additional arguments would be needed to claim that under 
such conditions basic color judgements are systematically disturbed while perceptual 
experience remains unaffected (of course, with ambiguous stimuli or under suboptimal 
perceptual conditions it would be much more plausible to suppose cognitive penetration of 
judgement rather than perceptual experience). 
 (b) The alternative strategy to defend cognitive impenetrability could be to accept that this 
series of experiments demonstrates an actual influence on perceptual experience, but to deny it 
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as an argument against impenetrability because all influences take place within a single 
perceptual module and do not involve any top-down influences from cognitive areas. This 
argument only works for the strong impenetrability position. If one accepts these experiments 
as evidence for modifying perceptual experience, then the weak impenetrability claim cannot 
be maintained either because V1 is influenced by abstract concepts or visual templates (e.g. of 
yellow bananas), and these are too rich to be processed solely in early visual areas. The strong 
impenetrability claim in principle allows for top-down effects from rich abstract concepts onto 
“earlier” visual processes as long as they are completely part of the perceptual module. 
However, the latter presupposition is exactly what has never been established. After having 
presented striking evidence against the weak impenetrability claim (top-down influences on 
color experience and color processing), we can now focus on evidence against the strong 
impenetrability claim according to which all processing that happens before perceptual 
experience does not involve any cognition.  
 
3.2 Visual experience of a scene is affected by activated memorized visual templates  
Striking evidence for a change of perceptual experience is provided by impoverished black and 
white images, e.g. the well-known case of the Dalmatian dog. The image only seems to consist 
of randomly distributed black and white dots until we know to look out for a Dalmatian dog. 
Suddenly, we develop a different perceptual experience: we recognize the dog and can never 
go back to seeing the picture just as randomly distributed dots.  
How can or should we interpret this change of perceptual experience while looking at the same 
visual scene under the same perceptual conditions? Since it seems that the only change from 
one situation to a second later is the activation of the concept >Dalmatian dog< that causes the 
dramatic change in the perceptual experience, the best interpretation seems to be that this is a 
case of cognitive penetration. That is, a (relevant) causal effect of higher cognitive contents, the 
concept of >Dalmation dog<, probably involving a prototypical visual template of a Dalmatian 
dog, affects our perceptual experience. How is it possible to argue against cognitive penetration 
here? One way would be to argue that the activation of the concept and related visual template 
changes attentional processing and thereby produces new sensory inputs and thus influences 
perceptual experience. We do not want to deny that the activation of concepts may actually 
modify attentional processing but it needs to be shown by the defenders of an impenetrability 
claim that this is all that happens. Recent studies indicate that we can distinguish attention and 
expectation in visual experience and that top-down influences plausibly modify expectations 
playing a crucial role in perception (Summerfield & Egner 2009). It is much more plausible 
that, in addition to changes in attentional processing, processes of cognitive integration of the 
black and white dots take place after early visual processes are completed but before perceptual 
experience is stable. The integration process leads from spatially ordered black and white dots 
to the image of a Dalmatian dog. This integration process corresponds to the recurrent feed-
forward and feedback processing loops as already described in section 2.2. In addition to the 
empirical evidence reviewed there, an older study from Frith & Dolan (1997) provides nice 
support for the idea of cognitive integration of impoverished stimuli. They presented 
participants with an impoverished black and white image of a banana on some background. 
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Usually, hardly anyone recognizes the banana but perceives a pattern of black and white patches 
that cannot be integrated into any meaningful image. Later on, participants are presented with 
a clear image of the banana before viewing the impoverished image again. Contrasting the fMRI 
signal of the perception of the impoverished image before and after it was paired with the clear 
image resulted in a significant activation of the medial parietal lobe. The medial parietal lobe 
cannot be regarded as a candidate for early visual processes; it is thus most plausibly a candidate 
for higher-level processing. Therefore, changes of the perceptual experience of impoverished 
images are best explained as a result of cognitive penetration from a high-level area. The only 
alternative would be to include the medial parietal lobe into a big perceptual module which 
again is an implausible claim as discussed above. 
There is a final important defense strategy used by the impenetrability proponents, i.e. the 
perceptual learning argument. If they concede a modification of the perceptual processes 
happening between sensory input and perceptual experience, then this is supposedly a result of 
long-term changes within the perceptual module due to associative learning; e.g. the perceptual 
system supposedly learns what a Dalmatian dog or a banana looks like independent of any input 
from higher cognitive processes. In our view, we need at least the situational activation of the 
template of the Dalmatian dog to account for the observed change of perceptual experience. 
How should we classify this template activation: can it be purely perceptual or does it involve 
a higher cognitive process? The visual template of a Dalmation dog is a rich and categorical 
template with quite some variation (prototype character). This prototypical or invariant 
representation is plausibly anchored in higher cognitive processes.   
Furthermore, visual templates of objects (such as the prototypical template of a Dalmatian 
dog) are unlikely to be created solely by early visual processes: at least in the case of children 
(and adults, of course) who learned the concept of a Dalmation dog, the visual template is part 
of this concept and intensely interwoven with higher cognitive processes constituting the 
concept (this is a consequence of the discovery that concepts are anchored in sensorimotor 
representations, Barsalou 1999, 2008). An isolated activation of a parsimonious visual 
template which would be a candidate for perceptual learning is very implausible because 
concepts involve a rich organizational structure (see also Newen & Marchi, 2016). For the 
weak impenetrability claim this would exclude a pure perceptual learning explanation. Then, 
we are left with the strong impenetrability claim and thus, we are back to the arguments on 
the implausibility of a big perceptual module (see above) encompassing creation, storage and 
retrieval of visual templates and abstract concepts such as “animal”, ”dog”, ”fruit” or 
“banana” (and all other possible object categories). Additional convincing evidence against a 
perceptual learning explanation could be provided if there was evidence that perceptual 
experience can not only be modified by concepts acquired through long-term learning but by 
concepts implemented on a short-term time scale. For example, Kok et al. (2012) associated 
tones to grating stimuli of different orientations, and could thus elicit a visual expectation or 
activation of a specific visual template upon playing the tone to participants. The expected 
stimulus resulted in higher orientation sensitivity and sharpened neural representations in V1. 
Thus, priming a visual stimulus with an acoustic tone leads to template activation (expected 
orientation of the grating) and this modifies the perceptual processes as early as V1. One may 
still argue that these short-term modifications are part of a limited visual module because only 
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simple gratings (of orientation and contrast) were used which may not necessarily involve 
higher-level cognitive processes  or concepts. Therefore we  report in the following a study 
dealing with the recognition of numbers which is clearly a conceptual process. This 
fascinating experiment  used hypnosis. Hypnotic suggestions  are useful to implement new 
abstract concepts or visual templates on a short time scale. These concepts or templates can 
modify perceptual experience and their implementation. The activation of these concepts 
cannot be explained by perceptual learning since this is supposed to be a long-term process. 
 
3.3. Visual experience can be affected by posthypnotic suggestions 
With the aim to investigate the phenomenon of synesthesia, Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009) used 
hypnosis to test whether experiences of synesthesia could be induced in non-synesthetes. 
Although not being the focus of the study, the results indicate that cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience by newly acquired cognitive contents, excluding perceptual learning, is 
indeed possible. One group of participants was hypnotized with the aim of inducing digit-color 
associations such as “1” always being red, “2” always being yellow. Then participants were 
taken out of hypnosis (not consciously remembering the digit-color associations) and were told 
the following posthypnotic suggestion: ‘‘Look at that color; this is the color of the digit X, and 
whenever you see, think, or imagine that digit, you will always perceive it in that color.’’ After 
this suggestion, they were requested to perform a simple perceptual detection task of a digit 
printed in black. Let us explain the experiment in the case of the suggestion that “2” always 
appears yellow. The display actually presented a black “2” on differently colored backgrounds 
excluding black (red, yellow, green, blue, etc.). The working hypothesis was that participants 
with posthypnotic suggestion should not perceive the “2” on a yellow background because, 
according to the suggestion, the “2” should have the same color. The results of the study 
confirmed this hypothesis: participants who received posthypnotic suggestions of specific digit-
color association did not perceive the black digit associated with the same color as the 
background. Without post-hypnotic suggestion, the same participants perceived the digit 
normally. One conclusion of this study is that the semantic content of a short-term and 
reversible posthypnotic suggestion caused a change in perceptual experience. This rules out 
long-term perceptual learning effects as a potential cause of the observed effect. Furthermore, 
this study demonstrates a change of actual perceptual experience (rather than judgement) 
because the effect is based on a simple perceptual detection task.  
 
3.4 Intermediate summary 
We presented evidence for each of the key features indicating cognitive penetration: 1. We have 
shown that recent discoveries from neuroscience support top-down influences on early visual 
processes (including V1), including top-down influences with categorical content. We argued 
from three different perspectives: (a) brain structure and organisation, (b) temporal processing 
and (c) the functional evidence for categorical top-down influences. Since not all this evidence 
is directly related to visual experience, we reported in section 3 the most challenging studies 
demonstrating modified visual experiences by activating a cognitive content. The studies on 
modified color experiences provide evidence against the weak impenetrability claim. The 
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observations on impoverished black and white stimuli (sec. 3.2) provide evidence against the 
strong impenetrability thesis: cognitively triggered integration processes can play an important 
role in producing the perceptual experience of a visual scene. Finally, we excluded the argument 
from perceptual learning, i.e. that all reported effects do not involve cognitive top-down 
processes because they are supposed to be only a consequence of long-term learning processes 
that modified the perceptual system. This interpretation is excluded by the short-term cognitive 
effects shown in the hypnosis study (sec. 3.3). Thus, the sum of evidences justifies the claim 
that cognitive penetrability is the most plausible claim based on an inference to the best 
explanation (or systematization). At least the burden of proof lies now clearly on the side of the 
impenetrability claim. 
Defenders of the impenetrability claim could still argue that all this empirical evidence is not 
provided by a single experiment but by many different ones. This is not really a criticism as in 
empirical science, it is mostly the critical mass of evidence from many different studies 
complementing and replicating each other that form scientific facts. However, one could still 
wish for a decisive knock-down experiment. Ideally, such an experiment combines (i) a clear 
demonstration of a change of perceptual experience with a perceptual detection task, (ii) 
structural and functional evidence from neurosciences supporting the modification of 
perceptual processing, (iii) a demonstration that the effects are produced by a higher cognitive 
process, and finally (iv) that this cognitive process is implemented on a short time scale and 
thus cannot be explained away as an effect of perceptual learning. This is the methodological 
step to be taken by the ideal experiment demonstrating cognitive penetration. The evidence 
already available indicates that we are on our way to get there.  
 
4. Perception and Cognition: Is there a boundary between them? 
By defending cognitive penetration, do we deny any boundary between perception and 
cognition? Although this may seem so at first glance, this is not the case. To the contrary, 
without distinguishing between perception and cognition, we cannot get the debate started at 
all. We have to presuppose at least some distinction to ask the question whether higher-level 
cognitive processes can causally influence perceptual processes leading to a perceptual 
experience. Thus, to deny cognitive penetration because of the danger of loosing a distinction 
between perception and cognition is ill motivated. We can keep some distinction but we have 
to give up the idea of a clear-cut distinction.  
How should we think of the relation between cognition and perception then? Before specifying 
our own view, let us shortly report the most extreme positions that have recently been discussed. 
Firestone and Scholl (2015) combine their denial of cognitive penetration with the classic 
position that there is a sharp boundary between perception and cognition such that cognition 
never affects perception: “We have argued that there is a joint between perception and cognition 
to be carved by cognitive science, and that the nature of this joint is such that perception 
proceeds without any direct, unmediated influence from cognition.” As we have argued, this 
radical view of a large, totally non-penetrable perceptual module is neither compatible with 
empirical evidence nor is it conceptually or empirically plausible to speak of such a large 
perceptual module. The extreme counter position is e.g. expressed by Andy Clark (2013):  
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“All this makes the lines between perception and cognition fuzzy, perhaps even vanishing. In place 
of any real distinction between perception and belief we now get variable differences in the mixture 
of top-down and bottom-up influence, and differences of temporal and spatial scale in the internal 
models that are making the predictions. Top level (more ‘cognitive’) models intuitively correspond 
to increasingly abstract conceptions of the world and these tend to capture or depend upon 
regularities at larger temporal and spatial scales. Lower level (more ‘perceptual’) ones capture or 
depend upon the kinds of scale and detail most strongly associated with specific kinds of perceptual 
contact. (…) To perceive the world just is to use what you know to explain away the sensory signal 
across multiple spatial and temporal scales. The process of perception is thus inseparable from 
rational (broadly Bayesian) processes of belief fixation, and context (top down) effects are felt at 
every intermediate level of processing. As thought, sensing, and movement here unfold, we discover 
no stable or well-specified interface or interfaces between cognition and perception.” (2013: 10) 
 
In Clark’s view, we should give up any distinction between perception and cognition because 
the processing of the brain is best modelled as one of predictive coding all the way up and all 
the way down. In the framework of predictive coding it seems to make no sense to introduce 
any boundary. If one takes this position seriously, it follows that we no longer should 
distinguish between perception and cognition at all. But this would not allow us to account for 
visual illusions which remain stable even if we have full knowledge about how the perceptual 
system is tricked into the illusion. We highlighted that these phenomena are not the standard 
cases of everyday perception but they clearly exist. It seems to be that Clark is throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater. How can we account for stable visual illusions, on the one hand, 
and for cognitive penetration, on the other, and still tell a plausible story of the relation between 
perception and cognition?  
We agree that predictive coding (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2014) is a very plausible framework for 
explaining brain processing and perception. It implies a hierarchy of processes without any 
sharp boundary between these processes. But this framework is very general and remains 
compatible with distinguishing paradigmatic phenomena of cognition and perception even if 
the majority of phenomena lies in the middle ground in between both. The need to distinguish 
these three cases is exactly the account we take to be adequate: pure perception, everyday 
perception and pure cognition (including perception-based judgment). Paradigmatic 
phenomena of cognition are linguistic judgments but also perception-based beliefs or judgments 
which are conceptual but not necessarily linguistic (Newen & Bartels 2007): the content of a 
judgment can be completely characterized by the composition of conceptual contents. 
Paradigmatic cases of (pure) perception are e.g. the perception of impoverished pictures of 
black and white dots: the content of the perception of such pictures can best be described as 
non-conceptual, spatial organization of these dots independent from any high-level conceptual 
contents. The middle ground includes the majority of everyday perceptual experiences: to 
describe the content of these experiences, it seems adequate to use a combination of descriptions 
of non-conceptual, spatial organizations of dots intertwined with high-level and abstract 
conceptual contents to create a meaningful percept. Everyday perceptual experiences can have 
rich contents (Newen, 2016) but nevertheless can be clearly distinguished from perception-
based judgments. Our suggested account of distinguishing paradigmatic pure perception from 
paradigmatic pure cognition with the majority of perceptual phenomena as everyday rich 
perception as a middle ground presupposes the possibility of rich perceptual contents (Newen, 
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2016) and allows for both: that these rich contents are produced by perceptual learning or by 
cognitive penetration.  
5. Conclusion 
Let us summarize our view: We presented striking evidence against the weak impenetrability 
claim including (1) extensive structural feedback organization of the brain, (2) temporally very 
early feedback loops and (3) functional top-down processes modulating early visual processes 
by category-specific information. The strong impenetrability claim could incorporate these data 
by widening the “perceptual module” such that it includes rich but still internal processing in a 
very large perceptual module: Such a claim must or even wants to allow for “smart” perception 
(e.g. including category-specific information) but at the same time needs to demonstrate that all 
this smartness of perception is radically (and always) independent from any top-down 
influences originating in cognitive processing areas. We argued that this latter view presupposes 
an implausible version of a module. Therefore, we have to accept cognitive penetration of our 
perceptual experience. Furthermore, we described the framework for an ideal experiment 
demonstrating cognitive penetration as a future knock-down argument in the debate. From our 
perspective the evidence from many independent studies indicate that this will be manageable 
in the near future. Finally we outlined that our position against cognitive impenetrability does 
not imply that we have to give up the distinction between perception and cognition completely. 
A plausible view nicely compatible with cognitive penetration distinguishes paradigmatic cases 
(i) of perception, (ii) of cognition and allows for (iii) intermediate phenomena with a strong 
intertwinement of perception and cognition with everyday perception being the strongest 
candidate.  
 
Acknowledgement 
P.V. was supported by a fellowship from the German Research Foundation (Ve739/1-1). 
 
References 
Bannert, M. M., & Bartels, A. (2013). Decoding the yellow of a gray banana. Current 
Biology, 23(22), 2268–2272. 
Barsalou, L.W. (1999). Perceptual symbol system. Behavioral and Brain Science 22(4), 637–
660. 
Barsalou, L.W. (2008). Cognitive and neural contributions to understating the conceptual 
system. Current Directions in Psychological Science 17(2), 91-95. 
Beer, A. L., Plank, T., & Greenlee, M. W. (2011). Diffusion tensor imaging shows white 
matter tracts between human auditory and visual cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 
213(2–3), 299–308. 
Carandini, M., Demb, J. B., Mante, V., Tolhurst, D. J., Dan, Y., Olshausen, B. A., Gallant, 
J. L., & Rust, N. C. (2005). Do we know what the early visual system does? Journal of 
Neuroscience, 25(46), 10577–10597.  
 20 
 
Chen, Y.-C., & Spence, C. (2011a). Crossmodal semantic priming by naturalistic sounds and 
spoken words enhances visual sensitivity. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Human Perception and Performance, 37(5), 1554–1568.  
Chen, Y.-C., & Spence, C. (2011b). The crossmodal facilitation of visual object 
representations by sound: evidence from the backward masking paradigm. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 37(6), 1784–1802.  
Chen, Y.-C., Yeh, S.-L., & Spence, C. (2011). Crossmodal constraints on human perceptual 
awareness: auditory semantic modulation of binocular rivalry. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2, 212.  
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of 
cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 181–204. 
Cohen Kadosh, R., Henik, A., Catena, A., Walsh, V., & Fuentes, L. J. (2009). Induced cross-
modal synaesthetic experience without abnormal neuronal connections. Psychological 
Science, 20(2), 258–265.  
Çukur, T., Huth, A. G., Nishimoto, S., & Gallant, J. L. (2013). Functional subdomains within 
human FFA. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(42), 16748–16766.  
David, S. V., & Gallant, J. L. (2005). Predicting neuronal responses during natural vision. 
Network, 16(2–3), 239–260. 
de Haas, B., Schwarzkopf, D. S., Urner, M., & Rees, G. (2013). Auditory modulation of 
visual stimulus encoding in human retinotopic cortex. NeuroImage, 70, 258–267.  
Delk, J. L., & Fillenbaum, S. (1965). Differences in perceived color as a function of 
characteristic color. The American Journal of Psychology, 78(2), 290–293. 
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the flow of information. Cambridge/London: MIT Press. 
Drewes, J., Goren, G., Zhu, W., & Elder, J. H. (2016). Recurrent processing in the formation 
of shape percepts. Journal of Neuroscience, 36(1), 185–192.  
Eckert, M. A., Kamdar, N. V., Chang, C. E., Beckmann, C. F., Greicius, M. D., & Menon, V. 
(2008). A cross-modal system linking primary auditory and visual cortices: Evidence 
from intrinsic fMRI connectivity analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 29(7), 848–857.  
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the 
evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1–77.  
Fodor, J. A. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Foxe, J. J., & Simpson, G. V. (2002). Flow of activation from V1 to frontal cortex in humans. 
A framework for defining “early” visual processing. Experimental Brain Research, 
142(1), 139–150. 
Frith, C., & Dolan, R. J. (1997). Brain mechanisms associated with top-down processes in 
perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 352(1358), 1221–1230.  
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000). Expertise for cars and 
birds recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 3(2), 
191–197.  
Gilbert, C. D., & Li, W. (2013). Top-down influences on visual processing. Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience, 14(5), 350–363.  
Hansen, T., Olkkonen, M., Walter, S., & Gegenfurtner, K. R. (2006). Memory modulates 
color appearance. Nature Neuroscience, 9(11), 1367–1368.  
 21 
 
Howhy, J. (2014). The predictive mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hupé, J. M., James, A. C., Girard, P., Lomber, S. G., Payne, B. R., & Bullier, J. (2001). 
Feedback connections act on the early part of the responses in monkey visual cortex. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 85(1), 134–145. 
Hupé, J. M., James, A. C., Payne, B. R., Lomber, S. G., Girard, P., & Bullier, J. (1998). 
Cortical feedback improves discrimination between figure and background by V1, V2 
and V3 neurons. Nature, 394(6695), 784–787.  
Huth, A. G., Nishimoto, S., Vu, A. T., & Gallant, J. L. (2012). A continuous semantic space 
describes the representation of thousands of object and action categories across the 
human brain. Neuron, 76(6), 1210–1224.  
Kanwisher, N., Stanley, D., & Harris, A. (1999). The fusiform face area is selective for faces 
not animals. Neuroreport, 10(1), 183–187. 
Kanwisher, N., & Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: a cortical region specialized for 
the perception of faces. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 
Series B, Biological Sciences, 361(1476), 2109–2128.  
Kok, P., Jehee, J. F. M., & de Lange, F. P. (2012). Less is more: expectation sharpens 
representations in the primary visual cortex. Neuron, 75(2), 265–270. 
Lamme, V. A., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000). The distinct modes of vision offered by 
feedforward and recurrent processing. Trends in Neurosciences, 23(11), 571–579. 
Macpherson, F. (2012). Cognitive penetration of color experience. Rethinking the issue in 
light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), 
24-62. 
Markov, N. T., Ercsey-Ravasz, M., Van Essen, D. C., Knoblauch, K., Toroczkai, Z., & 
Kennedy, H. (2013). Cortical high-density counterstream architectures. Science, 
342(6158), 1238406. 
Michel, C. M., Seeck, M., & Murray, M. M. (2004). The speed of visual cognition. 
Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology, 57, 617–627. 
Morishima, Y., Akaishi, R., Yamada, Y., Okuda, J., Toma, K., & Sakai, K. (2009). Task-
specific signal transmission from prefrontal cortex in visual selective attention. Nature 
Neuroscience, 12(1), 85–91.  
Newen, A. (2016). Defending the liberal-content view of perceptual experience: direct social 
perception of emotions and person impressions. Synthese, doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-
1030-1033. 
Newen, A. & Bartels, A. (2007). Animal minds and the possession of concepts. In: 
Philosophical Psychology 20, 283-308. 
Newen, A. & Marchi, F. (2016). Concepts and their organizational structure: Concepts are 
templates based on mental files. In D. Hommen, C. Kann, T. Osswald (Eds), Concepts 
and Categorization. (pp. 197-227). Münster: mentis Verlag. 
O’Shea, J., Muggleton, N. G., Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2004). Timing of target 
discrimination in human frontal eye fields. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(6), 
1060–1067.  
Pascual-Leone, A., & Walsh, V. (2001). Fast backprojections from the motion to the primary 
visual area necessary for visual awareness. Science, 292(5516), 510–512.  
 22 
 
Pearson, J., Naselaris, T., Holmes, E. A., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2015). Mental Imagery: 
Functional Mechanisms and Clinical Applications. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
19(10), 590–602. 
Petro, L. S., Vizioli, L., & Muckli, L. (2014). Contributions of cortical feedback to sensory 
processing in primary visual cortex. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1223.  
Plomp, G., Hervais-Adelman, A., Astolfi, L., & Michel, C. M. (2015). Early recurrence and 
ongoing parietal driving during elementary visual processing. Scientific Reports, 5, 
18733.  
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive 
impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 341–365. 
Raftopoulos, A. (2011). Late vision: processes and epistemic status. Frontiers in Psychology. 
doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00382. 
Raftopoulus, A. (2014). The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content. Philosophical 
Psychology, 27(5), 601–620. 
Schirmer, A., Fox, P. M., & Grandjean, D. (2012). On the spatial organization of sound 
processing in the human temporal lobe: A meta-analysis. NeuroImage, 63(1), 137–
147.  
Scholte, H. S., Jolij, J., Fahrenfort, J. J., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2008). Feedforward and 
recurrent processing in scene segmentation: Electroencephalography and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(11), 2097–2109.  
Siegel, S. (2005). Which properties are represented in perception? In T. Szabó Gendler, & J. 
Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 481–503). Oxford: Clarendon. 
Silvanto, J., Cowey, A., Lavie, N., & Walsh, V. (2005). Striate cortex (V1) activity gates 
awareness of motion. Nature Neuroscience, 8(2), 143–144.  
Silvanto, J., Lavie, N., & Walsh, V. (2006). Stimulation of the human frontal eye fields 
modulates sensitivity of extrastriate visual cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 96(2), 
941–945. 
Summerfield, C., & Egner, T. (2009). Expectation (and attention) in visual cognition. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 13(9), 403–409. 
Vetter, P., Grosbras, M.-H., & Muckli, L. (2015). TMS over V5 disrupts motion prediction. 
Cerebral Cortex, 25(4), 1052–1059. 
Vetter, P., Petrini, K., Piwek, L. Smith, F.W., Solanki, V., Bennett, M., Pollick, F. & Muckli, 
L. (2016) Decoding emotional valence of sounds in early visual cortex. J Vis (Annual 
Meeting of the Vision Sciences Society). 
Vetter, P., Smith, F. W., & Muckli, L. (2014). Decoding sound and imagery content in early 
visual cortex. Current Biology, 24(11), 1256–1262. 
  
 
